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INTRODUCTION

³'D\DQGQLJKWFDQQRWGZHOOWRJHWKHU´1 The first sign of a rising sun appeared for
Native Americans on July 9, 2020. In McGirt v. Oklahoma,2 Natives around the country
celebrated what turned out to be their biggest victory at the United States Supreme Court
in decades.3 Centuries of the federal government taking away Native lands stopped in its
tracks.4 Years of humiliation seemed at an end.5 As Justice Neil Gorsuch said in his
McGirt v. Oklahoma PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ 7KH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW PDGH D ³SURPLVH´ WR
Native Americans²specifically, the Mvskoke Nation6²the benefits of which would be
REWDLQHG³>R@QWKHIDUHQGRIWKHWUDLORIWHDUV´ 7 The Supreme Court held in McGirt that
Congress had kept that promise by never disestablishing the Mvskoke reservation.8
Among other things, this means that the state of Oklahoma did not have criminal
jurisdiction over certain Native defendants, because the State has no authority to prosecute
Native offenders on Native lands. To say that McGirt was unexpected is an
understatement. The Supreme Court had a long history of not just ruling against Natives
but also demeaning them in the process. In 1913, for example, the Supreme Court declared
WKDW1DWLYHVZHUH³DVLPSOHXQLQIRUPHGDQGLQIHULRUSHRSOH´9 -XVWLFH*RUVXFK¶VRSLQLRQ
in 2020 struck a different note.
The holding means that Natives, like Mr. McGirt, may challenge their convictions

1. Native
American
Duwamish
Proverbs,
INSPIRATIONAL
PROVERBS,
https://www.inspirationalstories.com/proverbs/t/native-american-duwamish/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
2. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
3. See Elizabeth Reese, Welcome to the Maze: Race, Justice, and Jurisdiction in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 2020
U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2020) (noting that on ³[t]he morning of July 9th, American Indian tribal citizens
and non-Indian residents of eastern Oklahoma woke up and experienced a similar shock´); see also id. (Natives
³were able to win . . . without the indignities that have become the norm in the Supreme Court¶s Indian law
opinions.´) [hereinafter ³Reese, Welcome to the Maze´].
4. See Johnson v. M¶Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 565 n.e (1823) (noting that ³this Commonwealth hath the exclusive
right of preemption from the Indians, of all the lands within the limits of its own chartered territory, as described
by the act and constitution of government, in the year 1776´); see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (³History
shows that Congress knows how to withdraw a reservation when it can muster the will.´); cf. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York v. State of N.Y., 691 F.2d 1070, 1078 (1982) (An Article of Confederation ³separately
empowered the federal government to protect Indian lands as part of its war and peace and treaty-making
powers´).
5. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913) (granting tribal members Native status because they
were ³chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, [and] they are essentially
a simple, uninformed, and inferior people´); see Reese, Welcome to the Maze, supra note 3, at 3 (³Indian law
opinions are filled with the rhetoric of savagery and discussion of how the uncivilized status of tribal governments
warranted a lower status within the United States.´); see also, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637,
690 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that ³[t]he majority¶s repeated, analytically unnecessary
references to the fact that Baby Girl is 3/256 Cherokee by ancestry do nothing ´).
6. The official, legal name for the tribe is ³Muscogee (Creek) Nation.´ This was the name given to the tribe
by the federal government. The proper name from the Creek language, however, is the Mvskoke Nation. This
Article will utilize the proper name hereinafter. See Theodore Isham & Blue Clark, Creek Mvskoke, OKLA. HIST.
SOC¶Y, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=CR006 (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
7. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459.
8. Id.
9. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39.
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in federal or state court through a writ of habeas corpus and have them overturned, and
that Natives committing certain crimes on the Mvskoke reservation will be tried in federal
court. This holding, however, is unlikely to be constrained for much longer. Indian country
is a legal term applied in nearly every jurisdictional issue in Indian law²even in civil
cases.10 If the Mvskoke reservation is Indian country for purposes of the Major Crimes
Act, it is not unreasonable to expect that the same will hold true for all purposes.
Furthermore, it is very likely that the reservations of all of eastern Oklahoma²or at a
minimum the reservations of the Five Civilized Tribes11²will soon bH³,QGLDQFRXQWU\´12
Since the McGirt decision went into effect, and even before that, community stakeholders
have worried about the implications of Native reservations, which encompass almost all
of eastern Oklahoma.13 Will the McGirt holding be extended to their lands? What are the
criminal implications, including the jurisdiction of the State, tribe, and federal
government?14 Will Tulsa become a violent community, like other Native reservations?15
:KDW DUH 1DWLYH SULVRQHUV¶ SRVW-conviction rights²will hundreds if not thousands of
decades-old convictions be overturned?16 In fact, many have asked the author this very
question: Will the sky fall, now that the majority of Eastern Oklahoma is likely five
separate Native reservations? Should McGirt¶V KROGLQJ EH H[WHQGHG WR WKH RWKHU )LYH
&LYLOL]HG 7ULEHV RI 2NODKRPD D PDS RI WKH 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ ZRXOG ORRN OLNH WKLV

10. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding, in a tribal
membership dispute, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and applying 18
86&¶V³,QGLDQFRXQWU\´GHILQLWLRQWRWKHGLVSXWH 8QLWHG6WDWHVY0RUJDQ)G
WK&LU  UHYHUVLQJGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VLQMXQFWLRQDJDLQVWWKUHHQRQ-Indian individuals from selling intoxicating
beverages on the edge of the reservation without securing license from tribe and applying 18 U.S.C. § 1151);
:DUEHORZ¶V$LU9HQWXUes, Inc. v. C.I.R., 118 T.C. 37 (2002) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 1151 in a tax credit for wages
paid to Indian tribal members case).
11. This commonly accepted term refers to the Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations.
12. The United States Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals have remanded cases to lower
courts to determine if these reservations are still in-tact. See Wilson v. Oklahoma, 141 S. Ct. 224 (2020)
(Cherokee reservation); Johnson v. Oklahoma, 141 S. Ct. 192 (2020) (Seminole reservation); Davis v. Oklahoma,
141 S. Ct. 193 (2020) (Choctaw reservation); Terry v. Oklahoma, 141 S. Ct. 191 (2020) (Ottawa reservation);
Bentley v. Oklahoma, 141 S. Ct. 191 (2020) (Citizen Potawatomi reservation); Boss v. State, 2021 OK CR 3,
2021 WL 958372 (Okla. Cr. App. Aug. 12, 2020) (Chickasaw reservation); Codynah v. Oklahoma, C-2019-293
(Okla. Cr. App. Sept. 29, 2020) (Kiowa-Comanche-Apache reservation). In addition, Native defendants in
2NODKRPD DUH DSSHDOLQJ WKHLU FRQYLFWLRQV DUJXLQJ WKDW RWKHU WULEH¶V UHVHUYDWLRQ RQ ZKLFK WKH FULPH ZDV
committed was never disestablished. E.g., Oklahoma v. Lawhorn, S-2020-858 (Okla. Cr. App. Nov. 18, 2020)
(State arguing on appeal that the Quapaw reservation was disestablished).
13. See Brief for Respondent at 46, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526) (arguing that ³adopting [McGirt¶s]
theory would plunge the State into uncertainty for decades to come´). Immediately after the decision was
announced, Governor Kevin Stitt issued Executive Order 2020-24, forming a task force to address the many
uncertainties created by the McGirt opinion. See Press Release, Okla. Governor Kevin Stitt, Governor Stitt Forms
Commission to Advise State of Oklahoma Following U.S. Supreme Court Ruling (July 20, 2020) (on file with
author).
14. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2485±90 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the pre-McGirt practice of the State
assuming jurisdiction over Native offenders).
15. Native lands have historically been violent and void of law enforcement. See generally infra Part II.A.
16. See, e.g., McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2479 (³Still, Oklahoma and the dissent fear, µ[t]housands¶ of Native
Americans like Mr. McGirt µwait in the wings¶ to challenge the jurisdictional basis of their state court convictions.
But this number is admittedly speculative, because many defendants may choose to finish their state sentences
rather than risk reprosecution in federal court where sentences can be graver.´) (citation to the record omitted).
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(shaded areas denote Native lands over which the State has no jurisdiction):17

While many have undertaken to create a cursory overview of the criminal
implications of the McGirt decision,18 this is the first scholarly article to do so. Further, it
is the first scholarly article to bring to light the post-conviction remedies and obstacles for
Native prisoners.
To answer the question of whether the sky is falling, it is first necessary to
understand what exactly McGirt decided.19 In McGirt, a member of the Mvskoke Nation
challenged his decades-old20 rape conviction, contending that the state of Oklahoma had
QRMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUKLPEHFDXVHWKHRIIHQVHZDVFRPPLWWHG  E\DQ³,QGLDQ´ 21 and (2)
RQD1DWLYHUHVHUYDWLRQWKDWKDGQHYHUEHHQ³GLVHVWDEOLVKHG´PHDQLQJWKDW&RQJUHVVKDG
never terminated the reservation.22 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Mvskoke
UHVHUYDWLRQLV³,QGLDQFRXQWU\´IRUSXUSRVHVRIWKH0DMRU&ULPHV$FW²a federal statute
granting jurisdiction to the federal government for specific, serious crimes such as murder,
arson, and robbery.23
The immediate effects of the McGirt decision are necessarily criminal in nature. As
explained in this Article, the federal government now has jurisdiction, concurrent with the
WULEH¶VWRWU\DOOPDMRUFULPHVRFFXUULQJRQWKH0YVNRNHUHVHUYDWLRQSXUVXDQWWRthe Major
Crimes Act.24 This means that the caseload in the Northern District of Oklahoma and

17. Jack Healy & Adam Liptak, Landmark Supreme Court Ruling Affirms Native American Rights in
Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/supreme-court-oklahomamcgirt-creek-nation.html.
18. See, e.g., Mary Kathryn Nagle & Sarah Deer, McGirt v. Oklahoma: A Victory for Native Women, GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (July 20, 2020), https://www.gwlr.org/mcgirt-v-oklahoma-a-victory-for-native-women/.
19. For an in-depth discussion of McGirt¶s facts and holding, see Comment, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 600 (2020).
20. This is significant for the fact that scholars and attorneys did not realize that the State had no jurisdiction
over Native defendants in the in-tact lands of the Mvskoke Nation until recently.
21. This Article uses ³Indian´ to refer to legal definitions and ³Native´ to refer to the people group.
22. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2456.
23. See id. at 2456; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
24. See infra Part II.B.
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Eastern District of Oklahoma will increase dramatically. 25 It also means that state court
docket loads will decrease dramatically. Criminal jurisdiction is the most important effect
of McGirt, and, for that reason, it is the focus of this Article.
Furthermore, the decision means that Native prisoners who were convicted in state
court for crimes committed on the Mvskoke reservation may now challenge their
convictions in state court first and then in federal court through a writ of habeas corpus
and have them overturned.26 The effect of these challenges is likely overstated. As
explained below, the only prisoners who will be successful in challenging their convictions
are those who (1) have exhausted post-conviction remedies, (2) have not waived their
jurisdictional challenge, and (3) challenge their convictions within one year of them
becoming final.27 To alert readers to the dangers historically inherent on Native lands, Part
II discusses the staggering numbers of violent crimes on Native lands and the inadequate
jurisdictional scheme to address those crimes because of the McGirt decision. Part III
GLVWLQJXLVKHV 2NODKRPD¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ IURP WKH WULEH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ 3DUW ,V discusses
police powers²including cross-deputization agreements and what happens when a
suspect flees from the reservation or from off the reservation to the reservation. Part V
analyzes the effects of the McGirt decision on post-conviction rights, concluding that most
Native criminal defendants will not be able to challenge their convictions because they
have not exhausted their state court remedies, they have waived their jurisdictional
challenge, or the one-year statute of limitations has passed.
Finally, the Article concludes by stating the unknown: We do not yet know whether
the criminal effects of McGirt will be positive or negative. There are factors indicating that
it will be positive²such as certain prisoners being able to challenge their convictions and
have them overturned (which provides them their deserved forum) and law enforcement
cooperation through cross-deputization agreements. There are also potential negative
effects from the McGirt decision, like victims having to go through emotional turmoil
when their assailants are freed because of post-conviction challenges and the potential for
a jurisdictional void due to a lack of resources and confusion over which entity²the State,
federal government, or tribe²will investigate and prosecute crimes. In theory, it is
possible that trials could result in acquittal for some guilty persons if key witnesses have
died or evidence has been lost since the original trial. This confusion pales, however, in
comparison to the major victory McGirt gave to Natives in recognizing their right to
possess and govern their own territory. The federal, state, and tribal governments now have
an opportunity to deal with this reckoning in a constructive and cooperative manner.
II.

WHAT EVERY OKLAHOMAN NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT NATIVE RESERVATIONS

The McGirt decision will have a variety of practical and jurisdictional effects. Most
Oklahomans and Mvskoke members are likely asking themselves questions like, what
happens if I get a ticket? Will I have to pay the ticket if I am pulled over by a tribal officer

25. See Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, Oklahomans adjust to Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s judiciary system, OSAGE
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2020), http://osagenews.org/en/article/2020/08/17/oklahomans-adjust-muscogee-creek-nationsjudiciary-system/.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part V.
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(for non-Natives), or will I have to pay the ticket if I am pulled over by a State officer (for
Natives)? What will the State police do about crime over which they have no jurisdiction?
Does the Mvskoke Nation have the resources to investigate and prosecute violent crimes
involving Natives? These questions and more are answered in this Part. But to begin, one
must understand why criminal jurisdiction on Native lands is so important.
A. Lands of Violence
Violence is a major problem on Native lands. Native women and children, for
instance, are subject to the highest rates of murder, sexual assault, and violence in the
United States.28 Most of these crimes are committed by non-Natives.29 According to the
Department of Justice, eighty-six percent of Native women who reported sexual assault or
rape reported that the perpetrator was non-Native.30 As of 2004, the Justice Department
reported that Natives experienced a per capita rate of violence twice that of the United
6WDWHV¶UHVLGHQWSRSXODWLRQ31 According to a 2010 Report from the Department of Justice,
81.6 percent of Native men and 84.3 percent of Native women experience violence during
their lifetimes.32 One in three Natives reported violence committed against them in the last
year alone.33
Intimate partner violence is even worse. The 2010 Report showed that ninety percent
of Native women and eighty-five percent of Native men experienced violence stemming
from an intimate relationship with a non-Native.34 Additionally, 46.4 to 65.8 percent of
Native women have reported that they have been victims of sexual violence in their
lifetimes.35 Nationwide, Native women are murdered at a rate of 4.3 percent, while white
women are murdered at a rate of 1.5 percent. 36 Thus, Natives experience much more
violence than other populations in the United States.37
Historical racism, lack of funding caused by antipathy to the concept of tribal
sovereignty, and jurisdictional confusion are the main reasons for these disturbing
statistics. Federal laws prevent tribes from asserting jurisdiction over non-Indians because
28. Brief for Nat¶l Indigenous Women¶s Resource Center, Tribal Nations and Additional Advocacy
Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11,
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526).
29. Id. at 12.
30. 160 CONG. REC. 26, S941 (2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
32. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP¶T OF JUST., AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE,
1992±2002 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf.
32. ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, U.S. DEP¶T OF JUST., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT: VIOLENCE
AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKAN NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN 2 (2016),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249736.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 63.
36. Emiko Petrosky, et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Racial and Ethnic Differences in
Homicides of Adult Women and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence — United States, 2003–2014 (2017), in
66 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 74142 (2017).
37. See, e.g., ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, supra note 32, at 2; United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016 );
U.S. DEP¶T OF JUST., FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, at iv (2000)
³$PHULFDQ,QGLDQ$ODVka Native women and men report more violent victimization than do women and men
of other racial backgrounds . . . ´ 
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of stereotypes of inadequate tribal law enforcement and governments. In terms of funding,
the United States Commission on Civil Rights has stated twice that insufficient funding
has contributed to this violence.38 However, there is a positive trend toward funding. In
2019, the President of the United States created a task force to address the crisis of
murdered and missing Native women.39 This trend is still inadequate, though.40 State
governments were and are unwilling to donate adequate resources to tribes or the federal
government to enforce laws over which they have no jurisdiction to prosecute. 41 Federal
UHVRXUFHVVXFKDV)%,VXSSRUWDQG86$WWRUQH\V¶SURVHFXWLRQZHUHDQG are limited.42
Furthermore, tribes have very limited monetary and personnel resources. 43 So, many
crimes go unpunished on Native lands, making them some of the most dangerous lands in
America. With this background of violent statistics and the need for funding in mind, this
Article proceeds to delineate criminal jurisdiction on Native lands.
B. An Inadequate System
Criminal jurisdiction on Native lands has been properly described as a ³PD]H.´44
Indian country is defined by statute as meaning
(a) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government . . ., (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States . . ., and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished . . . .45

$IWHUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ McGirt, the lands belonging to the
Mvskoke Nation stemming from the Treaty of 1832 are part of its reservation. The
question remains whether this holding will soon apply to the other so-called Five Civilized
Tribes.46
38. See U.S. COMM¶N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING FEDERAL FUNDING SHORTFALL
FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 51, 64 (2018); U.S. COMM¶N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING
AND UNMET NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 67, 6871 (2003).
39. See Exec. Order No. 13,898, 84 Fed. Reg. 66059 (Dec. 2, 2019).
40. In 1978, the Supreme Court held that Native tribes could not prosecute these crimes on tribal lands. See
generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1987). However, Congress restored tribes¶ criminal
jurisdiction over non-Natives for certain domestic violence crimes in 2013. See Violence Against Women
Reauthorizations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, § 904, 127 Stat. 120 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1304).
41. See, e.g., Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away with Almost Anything,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-canget-away-with-almost-anything/273391/ (noting that ³[a] sheriff in a county that overlaps the reservation
admitted that sometimes his deputies escort non-Indian drunk drivers home rather than arrest and deliver them
to county jails, which are far away and often full´ and ³[i]f an incident requires a deputy, he could take hours to
arrive, due to the volume of calls he receives and the reservation¶s enormity´).
42. Id. (explaining that in 2011, the United States Justice Department did not prosecute sixty-five percent of
rape cases reported on Native reservations).
43. See Leah Bartos, Native American Tribes Have the Right, but Not the Resources, to Prosecute Abusers,
CAL. HEALTH REP. (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.calhealthreport.org/2014/10/22/native-american-tribes-havethe-right-but-not-the-resources-to-prosecute-abusers/.
44. See Reese, Welcome to the Maze, supra note 3 (noting that ³[t]he civil and criminal jurisdictional rules
governing Indian Country are so complicated that they¶re commonly described as a µmaze¶´).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
46. See, e.g., Chad Hunter, Conviction Appeals Piling up Following McGirt Decision, CHEROKEE PHOENIX
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/index/155258.
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All major crimes committed in Indian country where the perpetrator is an Indian²
GHILQHG   DV KDYLQJ ³VRPH ,QGLDQ EORRG´ DQG   EHLQJ D PHPEHU RI RU KDYLQJ DQ
affiliation with a federally recognized tribe47²are tried in federal court.48 Certain other
crimes are tried in federal court under the General Crimes Act unless the perpetrator and
victim are both Indians.49 These crimes include, for example, arson, assault, maiming,
theft, receiving stolen property, murder, manslaughter, and sexual offenses.50 The
Assimilative Crimes Act allows the federal government to borrow from state law when
there is no applicable federal law.51 If the crime is not covered by the Major Crimes Act
and is committed by one Native against another Native, the crime is tried in tribal court.52
All domestic violence cases against women and children when the perpetrator is Native or
non-Native and has a sufficient tie to the Native community prosecuting him or her are
tried in tribal court pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act, assuming the tribe has
opted into that statute (it does not apply to Alaska Native tribes), or concurrently in federal
court.53 The tribe retains the right to prosecute Native offenders in tribal court, although
there are statutory limitations on punishment pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act. 54
Therefore, most Indian defendants post-McGirt will be tried in federal court or tribal court.
Most non-Native crimes will be tried in state court.
Determining jurisdiction therefore requires consideration of several factors in
combination: the type of offense (major or minor crime), the identity of the victim and
perpetrator (Native or non-Native), and the location of the offense (on- or offreservation).55 Here is a helpful chart simplifying the jurisdictional scheme.56
Victim Status

Type of Crime

Jurisdiction

Native Offenders

Native Victim

Major crimes57

Federal

All remaining crimes in tribal

Tribal

47. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277,
1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rogers, 45
U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
49. See id. § 1152.
50. Id. (providing crimes).
51. See id.
52. FELIX A. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.04 (2012).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
54. Id. § 1302; COHEN supra note 52, at § 9.04.
55. Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrowFausett, Fresh Pursuit onto Native American Reservations: State
Rights ‘To Pursue Savage Hostile Indian Marauders Across the Border’, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 193 (1988)
[hereinafter ³Royster, Fresh Pursuit´].
56. This chart is derived from a chart promulgated by Arvo Q. Mikkanen of the Department of Justice. See
Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction Chart (Illustration), U.S. DEP¶T JUST. (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/page/file/1049076/download.
57. E.g., crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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codes58

Non-Native Victim

Victimless

Major crimes59

Federal

Other federal crimes60

Federal

All remaining crimes in tribal
codes61
Crimes in state code62

Tribal

Crimes in tribal code63

Tribal

Federal

Non-Native Offenders

Native

Federal crimes64

Federal

Crimes in state code65

Federal

For tribes that elect to participate Tribal
in the Violence Against Women
Act, domestic violence, dating
violence, or violation of
protective order (when defendant
(1) UHVLGHV LQ ³,QGLDQ FRXQWU\´
  LV HPSOR\HG LQ ³,QGLDQ
FRXQWU\´ RU   LV D VSRXVH
intimate partner, or dating
partner of a member of a
participating tribe or a Native
UHVLGLQJLQ³,QGLDQFRXQWU\´66

Non-Native

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Crimes in state code67

State

E.g., crimes defined in tribal codes or 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 if a CFR Court of Indian Offenses.
E.g., crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153.
E.g., crimes defined in tribal codes or 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 if a CFR Court of Indian Offenses.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153.
E.g., crimes defined in tribal codes or 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 if a CFR Court of Indian Offenses.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153.
See tribal codes pursuant to authority of 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
See generally United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
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III. JURISDICTIONAL DIVIDE
Keeping these violent statistics and general jurisdictional concepts in mind, this
Article proceeds to discuss the jurisdictional divide between the State of Oklahoma and
the tribe, i.e., the new status quo post-McGirt. Remember: The federal government still
plays a large role in all of this. It has concurrent jurisdiction over interracial crimes68²
those committed by a Native against a non-Native (concurrent with the tribe) or vice-versa
(concurrent with the State)²and exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes committed by a
Native.69 But most of the concerns will now be stated as follows: In what areas does the
State have jurisdiction and in what areas does the tribe have jurisdiction?
A. The State’s Criminal Jurisdiction Powers
We begin with the State. Prior to McGirt, the State had jurisdiction over all crimes
not committed by or against Natives on Native lands held in trust by a tribe. The following
6HFWLRQVH[SODLQWKH6WDWH¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDIWHUMcGirt.
i. Inside the Reservation
2NODKRPD¶VMXULVGLFWLRQZLWKLQWKH0YVNRNHUHVHUYDWLRQ³LVH[WUHPHO\OLPLWHG´70
As an overview, the State lacks jurisdiction over all Native defendants and victims.71 The
7HQWK &LUFXLW &RXUWRI $SSHDOV KDV VWDWHG WKDW ³>W@KH VWDWH RI 2NODKRPDGRHV QRW KDYH
jurisdiction over a criminal offense committed by one Creek Indian against another in
,QGLDQFRXQWU\´72
Although the federal government has authorized states to assume jurisdiction with
the consent of the tribe on Mvskoke lands, the State has taken no such action nor has it
obtained consent.73 The exception to the rule that the State has no jurisdiction over Natives
on the reservation is if there is a special grant of jurisdiction, such as a federal law like
Public Law 280 or tribal agreement (there are no such agreements in Oklahoma). 74 The
State has exclusive jurisdiction over non-Native defendants when the victim is also nonNative and the crime occurs on the reservation.75 The State can thus hail non-Native
suspects into state court when the victim is non-Native, and punish those suspects if

68. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
69. Id. § 1153.
70. Royster, Fresh Pursuit, supra note 55, at 220. As far as the legislature is concerned, it can regulate tribal
members. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation. 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980).
71. See Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1960, as rev’d, (July 7, 2016) (³Most states lack jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Indian country against Indian victims.´).
72. United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1062 (10th Cir. 1992).
73. Id.; see also Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1990); Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Okla. ex rel.
2NOD7D[&RPP¶Q829 F.2d 967, 980 (10th Cir. 1987); State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d
77, 87±88 (Okla. 1985).
74. See COHEN, supra note 52, at § 9.03[1].
75. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624; Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896) (³[I]n reserving to the
United States jurisdiction and control over Indian lands it was not intended to deprive [Montana] of power to
punish for crimes committed on a reservation or Indian lands by other than Indians or against Indians.´); New
York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 500 (1946) (As ³to crimes between whites and whites which do not
affect Indians, the McBratney line of decisions stands for the proposition that States, by virtue of their statehood,
have jurisdiction over such crimes.´).
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convicted.
When preparing to conduct her duties as officer of the peace, an officer can and
should first look to federal law when determining which suspect she can arrest in the
0YVNRNH UHVHUYDWLRQ $V )HOL[ &RKHQ KDV VWDWHG ³[t]he literal language of the [federal
Indian Country Crimes Act] encompasses all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian
FRXQWU\´76 Thus, it would appear that a State officer has no authority even to arrest nonNatives in Tulsa and its surrounding areas. But the U.S. Supreme Court in United States
v. McBratney held that a murder of a non-Native by another non-Native on a Colorado
Native reservation was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of Colorado.77 Courts
LQWHUSUHWLQJWKLV³McBratney UXOH´KDYHH[WHQGHGWKHUXOHWRDQ\FULPHFRPPLWWHGE\D
non-Native against a non-Native victim.78 The Court has considered the McBratney rule
as firm and unwavering precedent since that case was decided.79
Applying all of the above rules, suppose a Tulsa police officer receives a tip that a
crime is being committed²say, that a suspect is intending to murder a victim. This
example assumes that the officer has not been cross-deputized, which will be discussed
further in Part IV infra. Prior to McGirt, the officer would only have to determine whether
the crime is being committed on Native trust land, such as in a casino. If not, he or she had
the ability to investigate and make an arrest. Post-McGirt, the officer should first determine
whether the suspect is Native. 80 If the suspect is non-Native, the officer can and should
investigate and arrest the suspect. If the suspect is Native, however, the officer should
FRQWDFW D /LJKWKRUVH RIILFHU WKH WULEH¶V ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW SHUVRQQHO  WR FRQGXFW WKH
investigation and arrest the suspect. The only hesitation the officer should have when the
suspect is non-Native is if the crime clearly affects Natives or Native interests, such as the
burning down of a tribal building or a mass shooting at a tribal event. 81
A Tulsa police officer who has not been cross-deputized should hesitate when
investigating a crime committed by a non-Native when the crime involves a Native and
non-Native victim and the crime is committed in the Mvskoke reservation. For example,
suppose a non-Native is suspected of murdering two victims, one a Native and the other a
non-Native. This area of WKHODZLV³XQVHWWOHG´82 The State might have jurisdiction over
the non-Native defendant with regard to the non-Native victim, and federal jurisdiction
would be concurrent.83 But the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the
murder as it relates to the Native victim,84 so an investigation by an officer who has not
been cross-deputized is unwarranted. The officer in the example provided should contact
an FBI agent to conduct the investigation and arrest the non-Native defendant.
76. COHEN, supra note 52, at § 9.03[1].
77. 104 U.S. 621.
78. See generally, e.g., Ray, 326 U.S. 496; Draper, 164 U.S. 240.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324, 332 n.21 (1978); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1038,
at 2 (1976).
80. This is a difficult task. One possible way to tell is to ask if the suspect has a tribal card.
81. See, e.g., Mem., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep¶t Just., Jurisdiction Over “Victimless” Offenses
Committed By Non-Indians, 6 ILR K-1 (1979).
82. COHEN, supra note 52, at § 9.03[1].
83. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959) (noting that the general rule outside of Native
affairs is that the state and federal government may each try and punish the same conduct separately).
84. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 253±54 (1913).
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When deciding whether to prosecute a certain offense or exert jurisdiction over such
a prosecution, an Oklahoma state court judge and prosecutor, or both, by contrast, should
first analyze whether the crime was victimless, but the result of that analysis probably does
not affect whether the State has jurisdiction over the offense.85
ii. Outside the Reservation
The State has exclusive jurisdiction over non-federal crimes outside the Mvskoke
UHVHUYDWLRQ UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DQG YLFWLP¶V LGHQWLWLHV.86 The United States
6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVVWDWHGWKDW³>L@WKDVQHYHUEHHQGRXEWHGWKDW6WDWHVPD\SXQLVKFULPHV
FRPPLWWHGE\,QGLDQVHYHQUHVHUYDWLRQ,QGLDQVRXWVLGHRI,QGLDQFRXQWU\´ 87 This power
began when the State was admitted to the Union.88 7KXVWKH6WDWH¶VMXULVdiction over nonNatives and Natives off the reservation is the same.89
A State police officer should therefore not hesitate in performing all of his or her
duties outside of the Mvskoke reservation. He or she need not determine whether the
suspect or victim is Native or non-Native. Oklahoma state court judges and prosecutors
should first determine whether the offense was committed in or off reservation, and if
committed off reservation, they can prosecute.
B. The Mvskoke Nation’s Criminal Jurisdiction Powers
7KH 0YVNRNH 1DWLRQ¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ LV D IOLS RI WKH 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ 3ULRU WR
McGirt, the tribe had jurisdiction only over certain offenses committed by or against
Natives on Native trust lands or in certain circumstances outside of Native lands.90 As
explained below, it now has jurisdiction over Natives in the reservation. Like State
officials, Lighthorse officers, tribal court judges, and tribal prosecutors should determine
the status of the suspect and victim and where the crime was committed.
85. See COHEN, supra note 52, at § 9.03[1]; see also, e.g., State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002) (resisting arrest by tribal officer not victimless and therefore the state lacked jurisdiction); State v.
Thomas, 760 P.2d 96 (Mont. 1988) (upholding state jurisdiction over non-Native¶s failure to report automobile
accident on a Native reservation, striking cow owned by Native rancher, and concluding that the crime was
victimless despite harm to property of Native because the action penalized by statute is failure to report, not
injury to animal).
86. Royster, Fresh Pursuit, supra note 55, at 193.
87. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962); see also DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S.
425, 428 n.2 (1975); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514±15 (1896); Pablo v. People, 46 P. 636, 637 (Colo.
1896) (state law held applicable to Ute killing another Ute at off-reservation site); State v. Youpee, 61 P.2d 832,
836 (Mont. 1936) (state law applicable to Assiniboine accused of statutory rape of Assiniboine minor offreservation).
88. See, e.g., Sturdevant v. State, 251 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. 1977) (³Whatever sovereign power the federal
government had to try Indians for crimes committed off the reservation and on land ceded to the federal
government by treaty was transferred to the state upon its admission to the Union.´); see also id. at 52 n.1 (noting
that this principle applies ³only to state penal statutes not including fish and wildlife conservation laws´).
89. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148±49 (1973) (³Absent express federal law to the
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory
state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.´). The Supreme Court expressly noted in Jones that this
principle is ³as relevant to a State¶s tax laws as it is to state criminal laws.´ 411 U.S. at 149 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 n.18 (1983).
90. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 856 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the tribe had inherent authority
to prosecute a Native outside of its reservation when offense substantially affected tribal self-governance
interests).
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i. Inside the Reservation
Within the Mvskoke reservation, tribal jurisdiction over Natives is inherent,
meaning the tribe has jurisdiction unless a statute or the United States Constitution as
interpreted by federal courts provides otherwise.91 This jurisGLFWLRQVWHPVIURPWKHWULEH¶V
sovereign status as a ³µdistinct, independent political communit[y] . . . .¶´92 Included in
WKLVVRYHUHLJQVWDWXVLVWKHULJKW³µWRPDNH>WKHWULEH¶V@RZQODZVDQGEHUXOHGE\WKHP¶´93
The Mvskoke Nation has criminal jurisdiction over all Native members and
nonmembers of the tribe inside the reservation.94 It may also investigate crimes and arrest
suspects whether Native or non-Native,95 but non-Native suspects should be turned over
to State or federal authorities absent an agreement because the tribe lacks jurisdiction in
most cases over these suspects (with the exception of domestic violence cases, discussed
in Part IV, infra).
The Mvskoke Nation is the only sovereign able to enforce its laws on the reservation
absent a cross-deputization agreement.96 Additionally, Oklahoma has given the tribe the
authority to enforce state law on the reservation.97 :LWKRXW WKH 6WDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ WKH
Nation ³lacks the power to arrest, charge, jail, or prosecute non-[Native] offenders for
violations of state law on [the] reservation . . . .´98 With such express authority, by contrast,
a Lighthorse officer may conduct a warrantless seizure of a non-1DWLYH¶VSURSHUW\RQWKH
Mvskoke reservation when he or she has probable cause to do so.99
Tribal courts are bound by the Indian Civil Rights Act. 100 The Indian Civil Rights
Act grants certain constitutional rights to and imposes restrictions on prosecutions of
91. Royster, Fresh Pursuit, supra note 55, at 193±94.
92. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 559 (1832)); see also Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 332; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
557 (1975).
93. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 332 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)); see also
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55±56; Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557; Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (Native tribes, vested with
sovereign powers, have ³the right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce those laws by
criminal sanctions.´).
94. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2018); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207±09 (2004); United States v. Green,
140 F. App¶x 798, 800 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 557 n.281 (1976) (citing 4 NAT¶L AM. INDIAN CT. JUDGES
ASS¶N, JUST. AND THE AM. INDIAN 40 (1974)).
95. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1975); see State v. Ryder, 1981-NMCA017, 98 N.M. 453, 649 P.2d 756, 758±59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (³Oliphant does not prohibit an arrest of nonIndians. Indeed, Oliphant tacitly acknowledges that such an arrest may be made, so long as the Indian authorities
µpromptly deliver up any non-Indian offender, rather than try and punish him themselves.¶´ ³To hold that an
Indian police officer may stop offenders but upon determining they are non-Indians must let them go, would be
to subvert a substantial function of Indian police authorities and produce a ludicrous state of affairs which would
permit non-Indians to act unlawfully, with impunity, on Indian lands.´) (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), aff’d, 648 P.2d
774 (N.M. 1982).
96. Kevin Morrow, Bridging the Jurisdictional Void: Cross-Deputization Agreements in Indian Country, 94
N.D. L. REV. 65, 76 (2019) [hereinafter ³Morrow, Bridging the Jurisdictional Void´].
97. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 99 (2019); see also Mathew Lysakowski & Priya S. Jones, Tribal Law
Enforcement Authority to Enforce State Laws, 18 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 49, 56 (2016).
98. Morrow, Bridging the Jurisdictional Void, supra note 96, at 76 (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696±
97 (1990).
99. Green, 140 F. App¶x at 800, 801 (holding that a cross-deputized Lighthorse officer¶s warrantless seizure
of a non-Native¶s gun at a casino (tribal land) was justified).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2018); see also id. § 1301(2) GHILQLWLRQRI³powers of self-government´ 
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offenders.101 On-reservation jurisdiction to try Native offenders is generally restricted to
crimes where the maximum sentence is a term of imprisonment of up to three years or a
fine of $15,000, or both, or nine years for multiple offenses. 102 A Native offender must
also be provided counsel when tried for offenses subject to greater than one year of
imprisonment.103
For example, suppose a Lighthorse officer who is not cross-deputized suspects that
a person stole property from a warehouse. Prior to McGirt, the officer would have had to
determine whether the crime was committed on Native trust lands, and if so, determine the
³,QGLDQ´VWDWXVRIWKHRIIHQGHURUYLFWLP1RZWKHRIILFHUKDVIXOODXWKRULW\WRLQYHVWLJDWH
and detain the suspect upon a determination of probable cause,104 but a tribal court cannot
try the suspect, nor can a tribal prosecutor indict unless the suspect is Native. 105
The degree to which the Mvskoke Nation might use its criminal jurisdiction to
control who is permitted within the reservation remains unclear. At least one tribe has
adopted a statute banishing members from the reservation who violate the revised tribal
controlled-substance laws,106 and the Navajo Nation has attempted to banish non-Natives
from its reservation for violations of Navajo law.107 Should the Mvskoke legislature take
thiV VWHS LW UHPDLQV XQGHWHUPLQHG ZKHWKHU WKH ODZ ZLOO EH XSKHOG XQGHU WKH WULEH¶V
constitution. The Mvskoke Nation also has the power to exclude state police officers from
its reservation in some instances, but it has never exercised this power. 108 Generally, the
State lacks jurisdiction on state highways on the Mvskoke reservation.109 But with the
agreements in place,110 a Lighthorse officer or State trooper can arrest a person for
speeding on state highways.
Finally, the Mvskoke Nation may extradite its members from the reservation
101. Id. § 1302.
102. Id. (providing that ³[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . (7) (A) require
excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments; . . . (C) in no event impose for
conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of 3 years or a
fine of $15,000, or both; or (D) impose on a person a criminal proceeding a total penalty or punishment greater
than imprisonment for a term of 9 years´).
103. Id. at § 1302(c)(1).
104. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976).
105. See McBratney, 104 U.S. 621; Draper, 164 U.S. at 247 (³[I]n reserving to the United States jurisdiction
and control over Indian lands it was not intended to deprive [Montana] of power to punish for crimes committed
on a reservation or Indian lands by other than Indians or against Indians.´); Ray, 326 U.S. at 500 (As ³to crimes
between whites and whites which do not affect Indians, the McBratney line of decisions stands for the proposition
that States, by virtue of their statehood, have jurisdiction over such crimes.´).
106. Menominee Nation, Menominee Tribal Legislature, Amendment to Ordinance 80-17, § 5 (Apr. 16, 1987).
107. See Preamble to Tribal Council Resolution CO-73-78, NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, subch. 5 (Supp. 198485); see also NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 17, § 1901(C)(1) (1977) (providing exclusion of non-members who are
accused of conduct punishable under the laws of the tribe and who decline to consent in writing to the criminal
jurisdiction of the Navajo courts).
108. See, e.g., Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236, 1244±45 (10th
Cir. 2017); State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d 463, 467 (S.D. 1990); see also Duro, 495 U.S. at 696, superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 201, 82 Stat. 73, 77, as recognized in, United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
109. Morrow, Bridging the Jurisdictional Void, supra note 96, at 75; see also, e.g., Skokomish Indian Tribe
v. Mosbarger, 7 NICS App. 90 (Skokomish Ct. App. 2006) (tribe maintained jurisdiction over nonmember for
civil traffic enforcement); Norton, 862 F.3d at 1244±45; Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d at 467; see also Duro, 495
U.S. at 696, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 201, 82 Stat. 73, 77.
110. See Part II.B infra.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss3/10

14

Summers: The Sky Will Not Fall in Oklahoma

2021]

THE SKY WILL NOT FALL IN OKLAHOMA

485

pursuant to its sovereign powers.111 This is so even when the member resists.112 Illegal
arrests, i.e., an arrest in violation of a tribal extradition law, have also been validated.113
ii. Outside the Reservation
Outside of the reservation, the general rule is that the Mvskoke Nation has no
criminal jurisdiction, even over its members.114 One exception to this rule is that the
Mvskoke Nation has jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute members only when the conduct
implicates tribal self-government interests.115 For example, in Kelsey v. Pope, the Sixth
Circuit upheld a tribal conviction where the tribe prosecuted a member for sexual assault
and the crime occurred outside of the reservation.116 Another exception is if the crime is
a violation of an off-reservation treaty for hunting and fishing rights.117 But pursuant to
agreements with the State, Lighthorse members may enforce state law even outside of the
reservation.118
Pre-McGirt, a Lighthorse officer would determine whether the crime was committed
on Native trust lands and if so, determine whether the offender or victim was Native. Only
then could the officer make an arrest. A Lighthorse officer post-McGirt should first
determine whether the suspect is a member of the tribe when investigating outside of the
reservation. He or she should then determine whether the suspected crime implicates tribal
interests or if it violates an off-reservation hunting and fishing treaty. If he or she
determines that the suspect is a member and either of the two exceptions applies, he or she
should proceed with the investigation The investigation should also proceed if the offense
LVRQHRIVWDWHODZLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VLGHQWLW\Eut the officer should turn the
suspect over to state authorities in the case of a violation of state law rather than turning

111. Royster, Fresh Pursuit, supra note 55, at 228; see also Davis v. O¶Keefe, 283 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D. 1979)
(tribe has ³governmental authority to prescribe procedures for the orderly extradition to state authorities of tribal
members suspected of violating state law´); ³Extradition of Indian Fugitives to Reservations Where Offense Was
Committed,´ M-31194 (1941), 1 Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to Indian
Affairs 1917–1974, at 1066, 1068 (³Indian tribes have complete legal authority to seek and grant extradition´).
112. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 478±79
(1980) (White, J., concurring).
113. See, e.g., Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 526±27 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)
(upheld arrest in violation of tribal extradition law); Weddell v. Meirhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 214±15 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981) (denied suspect¶s claim that arrest was invalid because he was not extradited);
High Pine v. Montana, 439 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1971) (denying habeas corpus relief, even assuming
petitioner was illegally arrested by tribal police and extradited from reservation).
114. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191; but see Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (calling Oliphant¶s created doctrine ³implicit
divestiture´); see also DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (³If the lands in question are
within a continuing µreservation,¶ jurisdiction is in the tribe and the Federal Government . . . . On the other hand,
if the lands are not within a continuing reservation, jurisdiction is in the State.´).
115. See COHEN, supra note 52, at § 9.04.
116. 809 F.3d 849, 868 (6th Cir. 2016) (denying federal habeas corpus relief to a member convicted in tribal
court for committing misdemeanor sexual assault by inappropriately touching a tribal employee at the tribe¶s offreservation community center).
117. E.g., Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676,
686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1975), vacated on other grounds, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (³[R]egulatory
interference by the state with treaty fishing is obnoxious to the treaty tribes. These tribes have the power to
regulate their own members and to arrest violators of their regulations apprehended on their reservation or at [off
reservation] µusually and accustomed¶ fishing sites.´).
118. Morrow, Bridging the Jurisdictional Void, supra note 96, at 73.
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the suspect over to tribal authorities.
IV. AUTHORITIES OF POLICE
The Article now turns to the ability of State and tribal police to exercise authority
outside of their jurisdictions through the use of cross-deputization agreements.
A. Multi-Jurisdictional Authority
Cross-deputization agreements provide Lighthorse officers and State police officers
the authority to arrest and detain individuals suspected of criminal activity outside of their
jurisdiction.119 In other words, a tribal officer may arrest a non-Native on tribal or state
lands and issue a citation pursuant to a cross-deputization agreement. And a state officer
can arrest a Native on state or tribal lands and imprison them in a state- or privately-owned
jail.
These agreements are a little known but very effective way to eliminate some of the
jurisdictional problems inherent with having a reservation next to a metroplex like Tulsa.
Agreements between tribes and the State are a matter of state policy. 120 Oklahoma law
provides for these agreements,121 and courts must enforce them.122
Cross-deputization agreements are on the rise.123 7KH\DUHRIWHQ³WKHEHVWZD\WR
provide services to these unique populations without wasting valuable resources on
LQHIIHFWLYHSURJUDPV´124 &RRSHUDWLRQLV³LQIXUWKHUDQFHRIIHGHUDOSROLF\IRUWKHEHQHILW
of ERWKWKH6WDWHRI2NODKRPDDQGWULEDOJRYHUQPHQWV´125 The Oklahoma Secretary of
State has listed hundreds of tribal-state agreements, including ones related to law
enforcement.126
Agreements between the Mvskoke Nation and the State are necessary. As one
scKRODUKDVSXWLW³>W@KHUHLVDOZD\VVRPHSROLFHIRUFHDQGFRXUWZLWKMXULVGLFWLRQWRVWRS
119. United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir. 1992) (observing the ³jurisdictional void´ preMcGirt when Oklahoma¶s Native jurisdiction was a ³checkerboard of Indian and non-Indian land´); see also id.
(agreements ³may assist in filling a jurisdictional void´).
120. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 1221(B) (State policy ³recognizes the unique status of Indian tribes within the
federal government and . . . work[s] in a spirit of cooperation with all federally recognized Indian tribes in
furtherance of federal policy for the benefit of both the State of Oklahoma and tribal governments.´).
121. See id. at (C)(1) (stating that the Oklahoma executive division and Oklahoman political subdivisions may
³negotiate and enter into cooperative agreements´ with Indian tribes in the state ³to address issues of mutual
interest´).
122. See Rule 30(B) of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, App., R. 30(B),
(providing that ³[t]he district courts of the State of Oklahoma shall grant full faith and credit and cause to be
enforced any tribal judgment where the tribal court that issued the judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of
the courts of the State of Oklahoma, provided, a tribal court judgment shall receive no greater effect or full faith
and credit under this rule than would a similar or comparable judgment of a sister state.´  see Barrett v. Barrett,
878 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 1994); see also FULL FAITH AND CREDIT OF TRIBAL COURTS, OKLA. STATE CTS.
NETWORK (Apr. 18, 2019), http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=458214.
123. See Conference of Western Attorneys General, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 14, at 1022 (2018)
(noting that these agreements not only ³resolve the core uncertainties´ on jurisdiction, but also result in more
effective delivery).
124. Nat¶l Conference of State Legislatures, Government to Government: Models of Cooperation Between
States and Tribes 1, 3 (2009).
125. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 1221(B).
126. See
Tribal
Compacts
and
Agreements,
OKLA.
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
https://www.sos.ok.gov/gov/tribal.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss3/10

16

Summers: The Sky Will Not Fall in Oklahoma

2021]

THE SKY WILL NOT FALL IN OKLAHOMA

487

arrest, and convict offenders, but the current framework creates a system in which the
police who are most prevalent in the area are often not the ones with authoriW\´127 It is
difficult in general to tell on Native lands which VRYHUHLJQ¶VMXULVGLFWLRQWUXPSVWKDWRIWKH
other.128 Officer hesitation can be a serious issue.129
By law, a tribe may assume federal law enforcement authority by contracting with
the Bureau of ,QGLDQ$IIDLUV ³%,$´ WKURXJKWKH,QGLDQ6HOI-Determination and Education
$VVLVWDQFH$FWRI ³3/´ 130 The Mvskoke police department, like other Native
police departments, is administered by the tribe through a PL 638 contract. 131 The State
determines whether Lighthorse members may enforce state law in Tulsa and other places
in the Mvskoke reservation.132
The Mvskoke Nation has entered into these agreements with the State of
Oklahoma,133 and these are much needed in light of the high crime rate in Oklahoma and
Tulsa, specifically.134 If proper agreements and procedures are not in place, Tulsa and its
VXUURXQGLQJ DUHDV DUH LQ GDQJHU RI EHFRPLQJ D FULPLQDO¶V SDUDGLVH 135 The State of
Oklahoma has granted authority to Lighthorse officers to enforce Oklahoma law on the
reservation.136 In 2013, Oklahoma passed a law granting Lighthorse officers and other
tribal law enforcement agents the authority to enforce state laws on and off the
reservation.137 Lighthorse officers must meet state training standards and liability
requirements in order to enforce state laws. 138
Oklahoma and the tribe have entered into agreements with a total of forty of the
forty-four counties whose borders lie, in whole or in part, within the bounds of the
Mvskoke reservation.139 Pursuant to these agreements, Lighthorse officers commissioned

127. Developments in the Law, Fresh Pursuit From Indian Country: Tribal Authority to Pursue Suspects onto
State Land, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1689 n.35 (2016).
128. AMNESTY INT¶L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE USA 1, 62 (2007) (asserting that ³some crimes just fall through the cracks´ LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQV
omitted)).
129. See, e.g., Davis v. Dir., N.D. Dep¶t of Transp., 467 N.W.2d 420, 423 (N.D. 1991) (officer mistakenly
thought he was on reservation, causing case to be dismissed).
130. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450).
131. See DEPUTATION AGREEMENT, MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION (2006), http://www.mcn-nsn.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Special-Law-Enforcement-Commission-Deputation-Agreement-1.pdf.
132. Morrow, Bridging the Jurisdictional Void, supra note 96, at 73.
133. See ADDENDUM TO DEPUTATION AGREEMENT, MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION (2020), https://www.mcnnsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Tulsa-cross-dep.pdf.
134. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, Tables 4 & 5 (2018),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crimein-the-u.s.-2018 (publishing data showing Oklahoma as the state
with the twelfth highest rate of violent crime reports); Sam Stebbins, The Midwest is Home to Many of America¶s
(Oct.
26,
2019),
Most
Dangerous
Cities,
USA
TODAY
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/10/26/crime-rate-higher-usdangerous-cities/40406541/; see also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 74 lns.15±19, Carpenter v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2018) (No. 17-1107).
135. See generally Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, Unguarded Indians: The Complete Failure of the PostOliphant Guardian and the Dual-Edged Nature of Parens Patriae, 2010 ILL. L.R. 1012, 1119 (2019).
136. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 99 (2018).
137. H.B. 1871, 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws 1270.
138. See Lysakowski & Jones, supra note 97, at 551.
139. Transcript of Oral Argument at 74 lns.15±19, Carpenter v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2018) (No. 171107).
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by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and certified by the Council on Law Enforcement
Education and Training may enforce Oklahoma state law in the same way that an
Oklahoma state police officer can.140 So, if a person is pulled over for speeding in Tulsa,
either a police officer, a state trooper, or a Lighthorse officer can issue a ticket to the person
that will be enforced in state court (if the person is non-Native) and tribal court (if the
person is Native). The same applies for a domestic violence call or any minor crime not
covered by the Major Crimes Act.
B. What Happens When a Suspect Flees a Jurisdiction?
This brings us to the doctrine of ³fresh pursuit,´ the notion that an officer should be
able to pursue a suspect who flees across jurisdictional boundaries even when the officer
would normally have no authority in the neighboring community. 141 Because criminals
often attempt to avoid arrest and prosecution by fleeing to or from the reservation, it is
vital that the fresh pursuit doctrine apply to Lighthorse officers and State police officers.
There is a large gap in jurisdictional power between the reservation borders and the
6WDWH¶V ERUGHUV ³7KH SUHVHQW MXULVGLFWLRQDO DSSRUWLRQPHQW E\ WHUULWRULDO
compartmentalization, while adequate to cover most arrest situations, is inadequate to
resolve the issue of fresh pursuit, where a Native suspected of violating state law off the
reservation [or vice-versa, a non-Native suspected of violating tribal law is pursued by
Lighthorse officers on the reservation is pursued off the reservation] is pursued by state
ODZHQIRUFHPHQWRIILFHUVDFURVVUHVHUYDWLRQERUGHUVRQWRWULEDOODQGV´142 Each sovereign
has jurisdiction²H[FOXVLYH LQ WKH 6WDWH¶V FDVH ZKHUH WKH FULPH ZDV FRPPLWWHG RIIreservation²over crimes committed in their lands.143 When the suspect flees to the other
VRYHUHLJQ¶VODQGVWKHUHVSHFWLYHRIILFHUKDVQRMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKHVXVSHFW
In Nevada v. HicksWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVWDWHGWKDW³>Q@RWKLQJLQWKHIHGHUDOVWDWXWRU\
scheme prescribes, or even remotely suggests, that state officers cannot enter a reservation
(including Indian-fee land) to investigate or prosecute violations of state law occurring off
the reservation.´144 However, there is some controversy in the academy about the
applicability of Hicks.145 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit has voided a state search warrant
because the property was within reservation and was rented by an enrolled member. 146
Practically, the issue of cross-border pursuits has a limited effect in Oklahoma. Most
state courts will avoid limiting tribal or state officers from arresting fleeing felons across

140. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 99 (2018).
141. Fennessy & Joscelyn, A National Study of Hot Pursuit, 48 DEN. L.J. 389, 390 n.3 (1972); Carson v. Pape,
112 N.W.2d 693, 697 (Wis. 1961); 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 51 (1962).
142. Royster, Fresh Pursuit, supra note 55, at 194.
143. See infra Part III.B.
144. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366 (2001); Jones, 411 U.S. at 148 (listing cases).
145. Compare Laura A. Shattuck, Comment, State v. Cummings: Collision with Nevada v. Hicks, 51 S.D. L.
REV. 373, 403 (2006) (Supreme Court¶s statements in Hicks appear to imply state criminal jurisdiction over the
reservations for off-reservation offenses), with Expert Report and Affidavit by Alex T. Skibine at 10, Jones v.
Norton, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (D. Utah 2012) (³Hicks is of very little relevance, if any, in assessing the legality of
hot pursuit by state officers inside Indian reservations.´).
146. United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990); accord United States v. Peltier, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 547±48 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (state judicial officer did not have authority to issue warrant to search
premises within Indian country).
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jurisdictional boundaries by honoring charges made against those felons.147 State officers
have the express authority to pursue suspects onto tribal land. 148 In fact, State officers
have been given full criminal authority over persons on the reservation, and an onreservation arrest for an off-reservation crime is valid whether or not the suspect is Native
American.149 They have the authority to arrest Native and non-Native suspects on the
reservation fleeing from off the reservation.150 The State has not yet determined that
Lighthorse officers have an inherent power (independent of a cross-deputization
agreement) to pursue fleeing suspects.151 But despite any lack of agreements, Lighthorse
RIILFHUV PD\ VWLOO ³H[HUFLVH WKHLU SRZHU WR GHWDLQ WKH RIIHQGHU DQG WUDQVSRUW KLP WR WKH
SURSHUDXWKRULWLHV´152 Therefore, if a Native or non-Native flees to the reservation or off
the reservation after being suspected of committing an offense, a State or Lighthorse
officer may detain them.
V.

POST-CONVICTION TURMOIL

The Article now turns to post-conviction rights and remedies. A complaint lodged
against the McGirt decision is that Native defendants who were convicted in state courts,
which now lack jurisdiction over those defendants, can appeal their convictions and have
them overturned. The State of Oklahoma represented in its brief before the Supreme Court
in McGirt WKDWDUXOLQJLQWKHWULEH¶VIDYRU³ULVNVUHRSHQLQJWKRXVDQGVRIVWDWHFRQYLFWLRQV
. . . cases that the federal government may be unable to retry because of statutes of
OLPLWDWLRQVVWDOHHYLGHQFHRULQVXIILFLHQWUHVRXUFHV´153 If this were true, the effects would
be overwhelming for victims and the public. The author takes the position, however, that
WKHHIIHFWVZLOOQRWEHRYHUZKHOPLQJEHFDXVHRILPSHGLPHQWVWR1DWLYHSULVRQHUV¶SRVWconviction rights through the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

147. See, e.g., State v. Bickham, 404 So. 2d 929, 932±33 (La. 1981).
148. United States v. Mikulski, 317 F.3d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349,
1354 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990)) (Oklahoma).
149. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987), superseded by statute,
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988), as recognized in, Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
150. Royster, Fresh Pursuit, at 224 (discussing that ³[e]ven on reservations not subject to Public Law 280
[like Oklahoma], state police arrests for off-reservation offenses have been held to be valid. As one commentator
has observed, the identity of the suspect as Native or non-Native has not been decisive´ (citing Bruce E. Bohlman,
Indians—Crimes by Indians out of Indian Country or Reservation—Jurisdiction of State to Arrest Indian on the
Reservation, 45 N.D. L. REV. 430, 431±32 (1969)); see also State v. Herber, 598 P.2d 1033 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(concerning state officers¶ capture and arrest of a non-Native suspect on reservation on charge of possession of
marijuana for sale).
151. See Developments in the Law, supra note 127, at 1689.
152. Duro, 495 U.S. at 697, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 201, 82
Stat. 73, 77, as recognized in, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also United States v. Terry, 400
F.3d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 2005) (suspect held in tribal jail overnight); United States v. Keys, 390 F. Supp. 2d 875,
884 (D.N.D. 2005) (detention by tribal police became unreasonable after two days); State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d
1332, 1342 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (tribe retained the right to stop non-Native violators and to detain them for
delivery to state authorities for prosecution); Colyer v. Dep¶t of Transp., 203 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Wyo. 2009)
(reservation officer may detain suspect for formal arrest by a state officer).
153. Brief for Respondent at 43, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526). Attorney for the State, Lisa Blatt,
stated at oral arguments during the Sharp v. Murphy case that hundreds of convicted felons will walk free: ³That¶s
155 murderers, 113 rapists, and over 200 felons who committed crimes against children.´ Transcript of Oral
Argument at 76 lns.1±3, Carpenter v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2018) (No. 17-1107).
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³$('3$´ 
A reporter from The Atlantic ZURWH WKDW VKH KDG IRXQG ³D OLVW RI  1DWLYH
Americans incarcerated as of December 31, 2019, for crimes that occurred in counties in
WKH WUHDW\ WHUULWRU\ RI DOO ILYH WULEHV´154 She estimated that, out of a sample of
DSSUR[LPDWHO\LQPDWHV³IHZHUWKDQSHUFHQW . . would actually qualify for a new
WULDO´155 She also looked at a sample that might qualify for federal habeas corpus relief.156
She estimated that for people convicted of first-GHJUHHPXUGHU³OHVVWKDQSHUFHQWDUH
eligible for federal habeas relief. . . . [For] people convicted of first-degree rape, about 5
SHUFHQWDUHHOLJLEOH´IRUIHGHUDOKDEHDVFRUSXVUHOLHI157 6KHHVWLPDWHGWKDW³>L@QWRWDOOHVV
than 10 percent of the nearly 300 convictions we examined are still within the one-year
VWDWXWHRIOLPLWDWLRQV>GLVFXVVHGEHORZ@FUHDWHGE\WKH>$('3$@´ 158
There are multiple problems with overturning sometimes decades old convictions.
First, there is staleness of the evidence. How can a prosecutor call a witness to testify about
a murder that occurred twenty years prior? What if the DNA evidence was thrown away?
7KHVHSUREOHPVDUHRIFRXUVHEDODQFHGZLWKIDLUQHVVWRGHIHQGDQWVDQGWKHWULEHV¶LQWHUHVW
in trying their members in federal court. Tribal defendants tried in federal court can get
out of the death penalty if the tribe consents.159 While the concerns have some merit, they
can be dispelled because of the finality of many of these convictions.
A. Overview of Habeas Corpus
Procedurally, a Native defendant who has been convicted in state court should
appeal their conviction through a writ of habeas corpus²specifically, through 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, which allows state prisoners to challenge their convictions. 160 After a prisoner in
custody under a criminal judgment issued by a state requests federal habeas relief through
§ 2254, a federal court may grant relief from that judgment if the prisoner shows that he
RU VKH ³LV LQ FXVWRG\ LQ YLRODWLRQ RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ RU ODZV Rr treaties of the United
States.161 In 1996, Congress amended § 2254 through the AEDPA, which added
procedural limitations to prisoners challenging their convictions, such as a one-year statute
of limitations and no provision for indigent counsel unless the prisoner was sentenced to
death.162
$VWDWHFRXUWGHIHQGDQW¶VKDEHDVSHWLWLRQPD\RQO\EHJUDQWHGLIWKHGHFLVLRQLVHLWKHU
  FRQWUDU\ WR ³FOHDUO\ HVWDEOLVKHG )HGHUDO ODZ´ RU   ZDV EDVHG RQ DQ XQUHDVRQDEOH
decision considering the evidence.163 As used LQ   G   WKH SKUDVH ³FOHDUO\
154. Rebecca Nagle, Oklahoma’s Suspect Argument in Front of the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (May 8,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/oklahomas-suspect-argument-front-supremecourt/611284/.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (1996); Grant Christensen, The Wrongful Death of an Indian: A Tribe’s Right to
Object to the Death Penalty, 68 UCLA L. REV. 404, 406±08 (2020).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
161. Id. § 2254(a).
162. See id. § 2244.
163. Id. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
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HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZ´PHDQV³WKHJRYHUQLQJOHJDOSULQFLSOHRUSULQFLSOHV´VWDWHGLQ³WKH
KROGLQJVDVRSSRVHGWRWKHGLFWDRI>WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V@GHFLVLRQVDVRIWKHWLPHRIWKH
relevant state-FRXUWGHFLVLRQ´164
Native petitioners should challenge their conviction by means of the first part of the
habeas statute, contending that their conviction was contrary to clearly established federal
law. In McGirt, the Court paved the way for this argument by holding that the State of
2NODKRPD¶VODFNof jurisdiction over Native defendants on the Mvskoke reservation was
clearly established law.165 If clearly established law governs the federal claim presented
LQVWDWHFRXUWWKHVWDWHFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLVFRQWUDU\WRWKHODZLIWKDWGHFLVLRQ³DSSOLHVD
UXOHWKDWFRQWUDGLFWVWKHJRYHUQLQJODZVHWIRUWKLQ>WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V@FDVHV´ 166 If the
VWDWHFRXUWLGHQWLILHVDQGDSSOLHV³WKHFRUUHFWOHJDOUXOH´LWVGHFLVLRQZLOOQRWEH³FRQWUDU\
WR´IHGHUDOODZEXWWKHVWDWHFRXUW¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHFRUUHFWUXOHFDQVWLOOEHHYDOXDWHG
XQGHU G  ¶V³XQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQ¶FODXVH´167
As discussed above, the matter of an arrest and conviction is jurisdictional. A
jurisdictional defense cannot be waived,168 unlike some other defenses, like ineffective
assistance of counsel.169 Habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for challenging a state coXUW¶V
lack of jurisdiction.170 Oklahoma law allows a prisoner to challenge his or her conviction
through a habeas corpus petition based on lack of jurisdiction.171 It also allows a petitioner
to seek habeas relief on the basis of unconstitutional confinement. 172 $QG2NODKRPD¶V
post-conviction procedures provide a path for prisoners to raise a jurisdictional
challenge.173
These challenges are unlikely to succeed in the majority of cases. The initial
stumbling blocks are exhaustion and waiver, and the subsequent stumbling block is the

164. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71±72 (2003).
165. The Court did not use the term ³clearly established law´ or make the case retroactive to new petitioners.
However, the Tenth Circuit in Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 921 (10th Cir. 2017) (en banc), aff’d, Sharp v.
Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020), concluded that the Solem framework, which is the framework by which a court
determines that a reservation has not been disestablished, was clearly established law. See id. (stating that the
issue was ³[w]hether the OCCA rendered a decision contrary to this clearly established law when it resolved Mr.
Murphy¶s jurisdictional claim´ and concluding that ³it did because the OCCA failed to apply the Solem
framework and took an approach incompatible with it´). Because the Supreme Court affirmed this decision based
on the reasons stated in McGirt, McGirt is clearly established law. See Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412.
166. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
167. Id. at 406±07; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
168. Ex parte Merton, 205 P.2d 340, 342 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949) (noting that jurisdiction cannot be waived
in a habeas case).
169. Berget v. State, 907 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (reasoning that a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel must ³be raised on direct appeal, not through a collateral attack, or it is waived´); Strong
v. State, 902 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (same).
170. See Ex parte Smith, 187 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1947) (³It has been held that the remedy
of habeas corpus is available wherever it has been found that the court in which the petitioner was convicted had
no jurisdiction to try him, or that in its proceedings petitioner¶s constitutional rights were denied.´).
171. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080(b) (authorizing an individual previously convicted of and sentenced for a
crime to raise a jurisdiction challenge to the same).
172. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §1331; State v. Powell, 237 P.3d 779, 780 (Okla. 2010); see also Crank v. Jenks,
224 F. App¶x 838, 839 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (denying a certificate of appealability for a state prisoner¶s
federal habeas action, wherein he argued for retroactive application of state law affecting his parole, because he
had not first filed a habeas action in state court).
173. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080(b).
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one-year statute of limitations. However, further roadblocks are in front of incarcerated
individuals seeking to overturn their sentences. For instance, the Tenth Circuit has
determined that Murphy v. Royal (and likely now McGirt) provides insufficient basis for
overturning a conviction.174
B. The Issues of Exhaustion and Waiver
One problem that these defendants must overcome is exhaustion. 175 The United
States Supreme Court has stated that
[b]efore a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust
his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an
opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas
petition.176

Similarly, the AEDPA prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief to state
prisoners who have not exhausted available state remedies. Section 2254(b)(1) stDWHV³[a]n
application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless it appears that[] . . .
WKH DSSOLFDQW KDV H[KDXVWHG WKH UHPHGLHV DYDLODEOH LQ WKH FRXUWV RI WKH 6WDWH´ 6HFWLRQ
 F HODERUDWHVWKDW³>D@QDSSOLFDQWVKDOOQRWEHGHHPHd to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State[] . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to
UDLVH E\ DQ\ DYDLODEOH SURFHGXUH WKH TXHVWLRQ SUHVHQWHG´ 7KH $('3$¶V H[KDXVWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW ³LV GHVLJQHG WR JLYH WKH VWDWH FRurts a full and fair opportunity to resolve
federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts . . .
´177 ,QDGGLWLRQDIHGHUDOFRXUWPXVWGLVPLVV³PL[HGSHWLWLRQV´²petitions that include
exhausted claims and unexhausted claims.178 A federal court also has the option, in
addition to dismissing the mixed petition entirely, to (1) stay the habeas proceeding (if the
SHWLWLRQHUKDVVKRZQ³JRRGFDXVH´ 179 and permit the Native petitioner to return to state
court to exhaust unexhausted claims, (2) allow the Native petitioner to amend the petition
to dismiss unexhausted claims and proceed only on exhausted claims, or (3) deny the entire
petition on the merits.180 A defendant must raise an issue, like lack of jurisdiction, in his
174. See Dopp v. Martin, 750 F. App¶x 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2018); Boyd v. Martin, 747 F. App¶x 712, 716±17
(10th Cir. 2018).
175. Ronald Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice, in 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS, at § 19 (1973) (³One convicted
of crime in a state court, and claiming he was deprived of his constitutional rights in the state proceedings, does
not have an immediate right of recourse to the federal courts for habeas corpus relief; he must first exhaust the
remedies available to him in the state courts.´).
176. O¶Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
177. Id. at 845.
178. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). The Rhines Court stated:
As a result of the interplay between AEDPA¶s 1-year statute of limitations and Lundy¶s dismissal
requirement, petitioners who come to federal court with ³mixed´ petitions run the risk of forever
losing their opportunity of any federal review of their unexhausted claims. If a petitioner files a timely
but mixed petition in federal district court, and the district court dismisses it under Lundy after the
limitations period has expired, this will likely mean the termination of any federal review.
Id. at 275.
179. Id. at 278.
180. Wood v. McCollum, 833 F.3d 1272, 1273 (10th Cir. 2016); Moore v. Schoeman, 288 F.3d 1231, 1235
(10th Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Patterson v. Whitten, No. 18-CV-0153-GKF-JFJ, 2018 WL 6840153, at *3 (N.D.
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or her petition for habeas relief on direct appeal or in the first habeas petition to exhaust
state remedies.181 Without proper exhaustion, a habeas petition will fail and the defendant
will not obtain post-conviction relief.
At least two federal courts have dLVPLVVHG D 1DWLYH SULVRQHU¶V   SHWLWLRQ
because he failed to exhaust state court remedies.182 In Draper v. Pettigrew, for example,
D IHGHUDO MXGJH IRU WKH :HVWHUQ 'LVWULFW RI 2NODKRPD GLVPLVVHG WKH SULVRQHU¶V  
FODLP QRWLQJ WKDW ³WKH Section 2254 exhaustion requirement contains no exception for
MXULVGLFWLRQDO FODLPV´183 And in Morgan v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, a federal judge
UHMHFWHG D SULVRQHU¶V MXULVGLFWLRQDO FODLP QRWLQJ WKDW  ¶V H[KDXVWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQW
³GRHVQRWFRQWDLQDQH[FHSWLRQ´IRUDMXULVGLFWLRQDOMurphy (or McGirt) claim.184
Oklahoma state law that refuses to allow petitioners to present an argument that
could previously have been raised, viz., the argument was waived, is another issue with
McGirt post-conviction appeals.185 Waiver is likely to be a significant problem depending
on how Oklahoma courts view the arguments presented. According to Oklahoma law,
³LVVXHVWKDWZHUHQRWUDLVHGSUHYLRXVO\RQGLUHFWDSSHDOEXWZKLFKFRXOGKDYHEHHQUDLVHG
are waived for further UHYLHZ´186 7KH2NODKRPD&RXUWRI&ULPLQDO$SSHDOV ³2&&$´ 
has in at least one case found that a McGirt-W\SH FODLP ZDV ³ZDLYHG DQG SURFHGXUDOO\
EDUUHG´187 However, the United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment,188 and the
OCCA remanded for findings on the jurisdictional issue.189 At least one federal district
FRXUW KDV UHMHFWHG WKH 2&&$¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ RI waiver to a McGirt habeas corpus
challenge.190 Arguably, the Supreme Court also rejected the waiver doctrine when it
decided McGirt.191 Furthermore, there is Oklahoma law that states that jurisdictional
LVVXHV³DUHQHYHUZDLYHGDQGFDQWKHUHIRUHEHUDLVHGRQa FROODWHUDODSSHDO´192 It remains
Okla. Dec. 31, 2018) (granting a stay of the petition rather than dismissing the petition without prejudice or
requiring the petitioner to omit his unexhausted claim).
181. Logan v. State, 293 P.3d 969, 973 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (³>I]ssues that were not raised previously on
direct appeal, but which could have been raised, are waived for further review.´).
182. See Draper v. Pettigrew, No. CIV-20-800-D, 2020 WL 8225500, at *3, *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2020);
Morgan v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, No. CIV-18-290-G, 2018 WL 5660301, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2018).
183. 2020 WL 8225500, at *4.
184. 2018 WL 5660301, at *3.
185. See Nagle, supra note 154 (noting that ³Oklahoma¶s highest court for criminal appeals is already throwing
out most of the cases making the reservation argument´ reasoning that these arguments could have been asserted
in a prior appeal).
186. Logan v. State, 293 P.3d 969, 973 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1086).
187. Ord. Affirming Denial of Petitioner's 11th & Subsequent Application for Post-Conviction Relief at 3,
Johnson v. State (Okla. Crim. App. July 24, 2018) (No. PC-2018-343).
188. See Johnson v. Oklahoma, 141 S. Ct. 192 (2020).
189. See Ord. Remanding for Evidentiary Hearing, Johnson v. State (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2020) (No.
PC-2018-343).
190. See Deerleader v. Crow, No. 20-CV-0172-JED-CDL, 2021 WL 150014, at *2, *6 (N.D. Okla. Jan 15,
2021); see also, e.g., Tucker v. Lawson, No. CIV-20-979-J, 2020 WL 7222089, at *2±*3 (applying Younger
abstention to a McGirt claim when the claim was pending in state court).
191. Cf. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority erred by assuming
jurisdiction over a case over which it ³lack[ed] jurisdiction . . . because it rests on an adequate and independent
state ground´).
192. Wallace v. State, 935 P.2d 366, 372 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); see also Munson v. State, 758 P.2d 324,
332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Guthrey v. State, 374 P.2d 925, 927 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962). This rule that subject
matter jurisdiction is never waived applies to post-conviction relief. See Wackerly v. State, 237 P.3d 795, 797
(Okla. Crim. App. 2010).
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to be determined how (and whether) Oklahoma courts will apply this law, but it is likely
that state courts will treat jurisdictional arguments as not waived.
In practical terms, a Native prisoner must be wary of failing to raise his or her
MXULVGLFWLRQDO DUJXPHQW RQ GLUHFW DSSHDO 7KH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV ³ORQJ
UHFRJQL]HGWKDWµZKHUHWKHMXdgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which
is federal and the other non-federal in character, [its] jurisdiction fails if the non-federal
JURXQGLVLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHIHGHUDOJURXQGDQGDGHTXDWHWRVXSSRUWWKHMXGJPHQW¶´ 193
There are two ways to get around this problem, both identified by Justice Thomas in his
dissent in McGirt.194 )LUVWD1DWLYHSULVRQHUPD\DUJXH³WKDWWKHVWDWHSURFHGXUDOEDULV
QRWDQµDGHTXDWH¶JURXQGIRUGHFLVLRQLQWK>H@FDVH´ 195 Second, a Native prisoner may
DUJXHWKDWWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWKDVMXULVGLFWLRQEHFDXVHWKHVWDWHFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQGRHVQRWUHVW
on independent state grounds, but instead rests on federal grounds.196 A final point is that
the author could find no cases in which a federal court has dismissed a McGirt habeas
petition for lack of jurisdiction because it was decided on independent state grounds.
However, a Native prisoner challenging his or her convictions should be sure to point out
that the McGirt majority, which is binding precedent on all state courts, held that the
jurisdictional challenge rested on federal grounds.197
Exhaustion and waiver will be significant hurdles to overcome when an incarcerated
individual challenges his or her conviction based on McGirt. And many if not most
prisoners will not have the assistance of counsel, leaving them to figure out the complex
appeals procedures on their own. Practically, to avoid these hurdles, Native prisoners
should appeal their convictions to the OCCA, file for post-conviction relief in the state
district court and then to the OCCA if their challenge is denied, and then file a § 2254
motion in federal court. The federal court will likely abstain from hearing the matter if the
1DWLYHSULVRQHU¶VFDVHLVLQWKHSURFHVVRf review in state court.198 In addition, if the Native
prisoner has already filed a § 2254 motion in the federal district court, he or she must
appeal that decision and ask the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to file a
second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief.199
C. The Issue of Statute of Limitations
A subsequent hurdle Native defendants who have been convicted in state court have
to overcome is the one-year statute of limitations period under the AEDPA.200 The one193. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4 (1983) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210
(1935)).
194. See McGirt, 40 S. Ct. at 2503 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2479 n.15.
198. See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-20-1092-D, 2020 WL 7775453, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2020)
(applying Younger abstention when the Native prisoner¶s case was pending in Oklahoma state court).
199. See, e.g., Tripp v. Whitten, No. CIV-20-965-SLP, 2020 WL 7865721, at *2±*3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 16,
2020) (dismissing a second or successive habeas corpus petition because the Native prisoner did not obtain
permission from the Tenth Circuit to file a second or successive petition).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides as follows:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
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year filing requLUHPHQWFRPPHQFHVRQWKHGDWHWKH1DWLYHSULVRQHU¶VFRQYLFWLRQEHFRPHV
final, which occurs at the conclusion of direct review or when the time for direct review
has expired.201 In addition, tKLVOLPLWDWLRQSHULRGLVWROOHGIRU³>W@KHWLPHGXULQJZKLFKD
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
WRWKHSHUWLQHQWMXGJPHQWRUFODLPLVSHQGLQJ´202 An application for post-conviction relief
RURWKHUFROODWHUDOUHYLHZLV³SURSHUO\ILOHG´IRUSXUSRVHVRIVWDWXWRU\ WROOLQJ³ZKHQLWV
delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable [state] laws and rules
JRYHUQLQJILOLQJV´203 To obtain the benefit of statutory tolling, a Native prisoner must file
his or her application for state collateral review in accordance with applicable state rules
and within the one-year limitation period.204 If a Native pleads guilty, he or she must
directly appeal his or her judgment and sentence within ten days from the sentencing
hearing by filing a motion to withdraw plea and request an evidentiary hearing.205 Because
the limitation period is not jurisdictional, a federal court can also sometimes toll the
limitation period for equitable reasons.206
Unfortunately for Native defendants, none of the statutory tolling provisions will
work to toll the one-year statute of limitations. In Murphy, the Tenth Circuit explained that
the Teague doctrine²which provides that a defendant cannot attack his or her conviction
based on a rule that was established after his or her conviction became final, unless that
rule was made retroactive by the United States Supreme Court207²did not apply because
WKH ³GLVHVWDEOLVKPHQW´ DQDO\VLV208 ZDV QRW ³QHZ´209 Courts are very hesitant to apply
these statutory or equitable tolling principles in McGirt cases, reasoning that the one-year

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest
of²
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
201. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
202. Id. § 2244(d)(2).
203. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).
204. Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006); Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138±41 (10th
Cir. 2003).
205. Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435, 441 (10th Cir. 2012); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1051; OKLA. CRIM.
APP. R. 4.2(A) (2019).
206. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).
207. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (providing that ³new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are
announced´); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 n.1 (2008) (explaining that ³[a]lthough Teague
was a plurality opinion . . . the Teague rule was affirmed and applied by a majority of the Court shortly
thereafter´); see also Ronald Sokol, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE, in 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS, at § 28.5
(1973).
208. Disestablishment is the legal term used to denote when Congress has acted to terminate a reservation.
209. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 921, 929 n.36 (10th Cir. 2017) (en banc), aff’d, Sharp v. Murphy, 140
S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (explaining that ³none of the cases´ applying the Solem framework ³created a new rule´).
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VWDWXWH RI OLPLWDWLRQV SHULRG LV WROOHG ³RQO\ LQ UDUH DQG H[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ 210
Furthermore, federal courts are already declining to toll the statute of limitations period
based on arguments that McGirt announced a new constitutional right made retroactive on
appeal.211 Reports have already shown that these petitions are being denied by Oklahoma
courts.212 For example, there are cases coming out of the Northern District of Oklahoma
recognizing the one-year limitations period and either neglecting or refusing to discuss
statutory or equitable tolling.213 A Native defendant will thus only succeed if he or she
challenged his or her conviction within one year of the date the conviction became final²
and after he or she exhausts remedies through direct appeals and collateral review. It has
yet to be seen how many Native defendants will attempt this approach or succeed in their
challenges.214
D. The Problem of Proving Indian Status
Another issue Native SULVRQHUV ZLOO KDYH WR RYHUFRPH LV SURYLQJ WKHLU ³,QGLDQ´
status. The law, as described above, provides jurisdictional conditions on which sovereign
can try which offenders, depending on the Native status of the offender and victims. 215
7KHZRUG³,QGLDQ´DSpears in federal law delineating jurisdiction, but the term itself is not
defined.216 Therefore, a Native prisoner or his or her attorney must look to state and federal
law to define the term. The United States Supreme Court has not defined who is and who
iV QRW ³,QGLDQ´ EXW ORZHU FRXUWV KDYH WKHLU RZQ GHILQLWLRQV RI ³,QGLDQ´ GHULYHG IURP
United States v. Rogers.217
The Tenth Circuit, which is over Oklahoma federal courts, applies a two-part test
IRUGHWHUPLQLQJDQRIIHQGHURUYLFWLP¶V³,QGLDQ´VWDWXV218 ³>7]he court must make factual
findings that the defendant (1) has some Indian blood; and (2) is recognized as an Indian
E\ D WULEH RU E\ WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW´219 The Tenth Circuit did not say how much
Indian blood is required, but it is a proper inference that any amount of blood will do.220
The Tenth Circuit also has a factor-based test for determining the second prong of the
210. Barbre v. Whitten, No. CIV 18-259-RAW-KEW, 2019 WL 3976518, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2019)
(quoting York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522, 527 (10th Cir. 2003)).
211. See, e.g., Berry v. Braggs, No. 19-CV-0706-GKF-FHM, 2020 WL 6205849, at *6±*7 (N.D. Okla. Oct.
22, 2020). This federal district court also declined to apply any other statutory or equitable tolling principles to
the Native petitioner¶s case.
212. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 154 (noting that of the 140-plus petitions filed since the Tenth Circuit ruled
in Murphy v. Royal that the Mvskoke reservation had never been disestablished, these ³writs have produced a
slew of denials and dismissals´).
213. See, e.g., Berry v. Whitten, No. 20-CV-0668-CVE-JFJ, 2021 WL 262560, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 26,
2021) (concluding that the petitioner¶s McGirt claim ³is untimely and appears subject to dismissal under §
2244(b)(1)´).
214. On September 8, 2020, a Cherokee Nation reporter noted that the Cherokee Nation Attorney General was
³tracking more than 100 cases that involve appeals and pending criminal matters.´ Chad Hunter, Conviction
Appeals Piling up Following McGirt Decision, CHEROKEE PHOENIX (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/index/155258.
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153 (2020).
217. 45 U.S. 567, 572±73 (1846).
218. See United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001).
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id. at 1282±83 (citing cases that conclude that a quantum listed on a tribal enrollment card was sufficient).
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³,QGLDQ´VWDWXVWHVW  HQUROOPHQWLQD WULEH  JRYHUQPHQWUHFRJQLWLRQIRUPDOO\DQG
informally through providing the person assiVWDQFH UHVHUYHG RQO\ WR ³,QGLDQV´  
HQMR\LQJEHQHILWVRIWULEDODIILOLDWLRQDQG  VRFLDO UHFRJQLWLRQDVDQ³,QGLDQ´ WKURXJK
UHVLGHQFHRQDUHVHUYDWLRQRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ³,QGLDQ´VRFLDOOLIH 221
Oklahoma courts, however, are bound by state law or the United States Supreme
&RXUW¶VODZ7KH2&&$GHILQHV³,QGLDQ´DVKDYLQJ  ³DVLJQLILFDQWSHUFHQWDJHRI,QGLDQ
EORRG´ DQG  EHLQJ ³UHFRJQL]HG DV DQ ,QGLDQ HLWKHUE\ WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW RU E\
VRPH WULEH RU VRFLHW\ RI ,QGLDQV´222 7KH ³VLJQLILFDQW SHUFHQWDJH RI ,QGLDQ EORRG´
requirement is concerning, because it is unclear how much of a degree is necessary to
satisfy the test. In Goforth, the defendant who ZDV ³VOLJKWO\ OHVV WKDQ RQe-quarter
Cherokee[,]´ satisfied that prong of the test.223 But what about a Native who is a member
of his or her tribe but has a very insignificant amount of Native blood? The answer under
2NODKRPDODZDVWRZKHWKHUWKLVLQGLYLGXDOLV³,QGLDQ´LVXQFOHDU,WLVDOVRSHUSOH[LQJ
ZKDWWKHVHFRQGSURQJRIWKH2NODKRPD³,QGLDQ´VWDtus test means. Does an individual
need to be a member of his or her tribe, or is it sufficient if he or she simply identifies with
the tribe? The Supreme Court has said no.224 It is unclear, however, what the requirement
for non-members is under Oklahoma law.
Finally, tribal jurisdiction is not limited to enrolled members or blood quantum. For
instance, the Mvskoke Nation has jurisdiction over all Natives. 225 The Cherokee Nation
GHILQHV³,QGLDQ´DV³DQ\SHUVRQZKRLVDPHPEHURUZKRLVHOLJLEOHIRUPHPEHUVKLp in a
federally-UHFRJQL]HGWULEHQDWLRQRUEDQGRI,QGLDQV´ 226
As an aside, if a Native prisoner is a Freedman (a descendant of a former enslaved
SHUVRQRIRQHRIWKHWULEHV KHRUVKHZLOOOLNHO\QRWTXDOLI\DV³,QGLDQ´XQOHVVKHRUVKH
can demonstratHVRPHTXDQWXPRI³,QGLDQ´EORRG227 A possible issue courts will have to
consider is whether this classification of the Freedmen violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution.228
A Native prisoner will be required to prove his or KHU ³,QGLDQ´ VWDWXV ZKHQ
challenging his or her conviction. It is necessary for Natives and practitioners to be familiar
ZLWKWKHYDULRXV³,QGLDQ´VWDWXVWHVWVIRUSXUSRVHVRIDSSHDOLQJFRQYLFWLRQV

221. United States v. Nowlin, 555 F. App¶x 820, 823 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (quoting St. Cloud v.
United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988)).
222. Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (citing Rogers, 45 U.S. at 567).
223. Id.
224. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647 n.7 (1977) (³>E]nrollment in an official tribe has not
been held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction.´).
225. See MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 1-102.
226. CHEROKEE NATION CODE, § 2-103; see also CHEROKEE NATION CODE tit. 10, ch. 1B § 40.2(3) (³µIndian,¶
means a person who is either: (a) a member of an Indian tribe; or (b) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.´).
227. See Clint Summers, Rethinking the Federal Indian Status Test: A Look at the Supreme Court’s
Classification of the Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribe of Oklahoma, 7 AM. INDIAN L.J. 194, 214 (2018)
[hereinafter ³Summers, Rethinking the Federal Indian Status Test´]; see also Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S.
499, 501 (1896) (finding that a Freedman was not ³Indian´); Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 617 (1896)
(same).
228. See Summers, Rethinking the Federal Indian Status Test, at 220±24 (arguing that the ³Indian´ status test
violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma).
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E. A Success Story: Deerleader v. Crow
The federal court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, which encompasses much
of the Mvskoke reservation, recently granted a § 2254 writ of habeas corpus in Deerleader
v. Crow.229 An analysis of that case provides hope at the end of the tunnel for other Natives
who wish to challenge their convictions.
In Deerleader, a Native American was convicted by a jury in Creek County,
Oklahoma, of second-degree burglary and larceny of an automobile, both violations of
state law.230 Because Deerleader had been convicted of two prior felonies, his sentence
was forty-five years as to both counts, to be served consecutively, for a total of ninety
years of imprisonment.231 He was sentenced on June 5, 2017.232
Following his conviction, Deerleader filed a direct appeal in the OCCA, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the length of his
sentences.233 The OCCA affirmed the judgment and sentence, and Deerleader applied for
postconviction relief in state district court.234 He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel
at the trial and appellate levels; additionally, he asserted that the State lacked jurisdiction
over his criminal prosecution because he is Native and a citizen of the Mvskoke Nation
and committed the crimes within the historical boundaries of the Mvskoke reservation.235
³7KH VWDWH GLVWULFW FRXUW VHHPLQJO\ IRXQG WKDW 'HHUOHDGHU¶V FODLPV ZHUH SURFHGXUDOO\
barred and without merit.´236 The state district court also noted that, because Murphy, the
predecessor of McGirt, was then pending before the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit
KDG LVVXHG D VWD\ RQ WKH PDQGDWH RI WKDW FDVH 'HHUOHDGHU¶V FODLP ZDV SUHPDWXUH 237
Deerleader then timely filed a post-conviction appeal to the OCCA.238
7KH2&&$UHMHFWHG'HHUOHDGHU¶VLQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHODnd sufficiency
of the evidence claims and held that his jurisdictional challenge was without merit with
little explanation.239 Deerleader then filed a § 2254 federal habeas petition on April 27,
2020.240 Relevant to this Article, Deerleader challenged his conviction and sentence,
claiming that the State lacked jurisdiction over him.241
-XGJH 'RZGHOO RI WKH 1RUWKHUQ 'LVWULFW RI 2NODKRPD DFFHSWHG 'HHUOHDGHU¶V
contention that the State lacked jurisdiction over him and overturned his conviction and
sentence, ordering his immediate release. 242 Judge Dowdell first discussed the Murphy
and McGirt cases.243 He noted that re-H[KDXVWLRQRI'HHUOHDGHU¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDUJXPHQWLQ
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Deerleader, 2021 WL 150014, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 15, 2021).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Deerleader, 2021 WL 150014, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Deerleader, 2021 WL 150014, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
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light of the recent McGirt decision (which was decided after the OCCA heard 'HHUOHDGHU¶V
case) was unnecessary.244
Next, Judge Dowdell discussed the relevant habeas law.245 He noted that § 2254
GRHVQRWEDUKDEHDVUHOLHIEHFDXVHWKH2&&$¶VGHFLVLRQDVWR'HHUOHDGHU¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDO
claim was contrary to clearly established federal law.246 Judge Dowdell then proceeded to
WKH PHULWV RI 'HHUOHDGHU¶V SHWLWLRQ +H KHOG WKDW 'HHUOHDGHU¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW KH ZDV
³,QGLDQ´was within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 (note that Judge Dowdell
extended McGirt¶V KROGLQJ WKDW WKH 0YVNRNH 1DWLRQ¶V UHVHUYDWLRQ LV OLPLWHG WR 0DMRU
Crimes Act offenses).247 7RHVWDEOLVKKLV³,QGLDQ´VWDWXV'HHUOHDGHUSURYLGHGHYLGHQFH
that he was an enrolled member of the Mvskoke Nation and that he had 7/16 Mvskoke
blood.248 Judge Dowdell next reasoned that the law DQG UHFRUG VXSSRUW 'HHUOHDGHU¶V
FRQWHQWLRQWKDWKH FRPPLWWHGWKHFULPHVLQ³,QGLDQFRXQWU\´DVGHILQHGLQ86&
1151(a).249 )LQDOO\ DIWHU FRQVLGHULQJ 'HHUOHDGHU¶V ³,QGLDQ´ VWDWXV DQG WKH IDFW WKDWWKH
FULPHVZHUH FRPPLWWHGLQ³,QGLDQFRXQWU\´-XGJH Dowdell found that Deerleader was
entitled to federal habeas relief.250
As a result of this, Judge Dowdell was required to determine the remedy. He noted
WKDW³>I@HGHUDOFRXUWVDUHDXWKRUL]HGXQGHU86&WRGLVSRVHRIDKDEHDVFRUSXV
petition as law and justice require and thus have broad discretion to craft appropriate
habeas UHOLHI´251 Judge Dowdell stated that because the State cannot correct the
MXULVGLFWLRQDO HUURU LQ 'HHUOHDGHU¶V FDVH WKURXJK IXUWKHU SURFHHGLQJV WKH DSSURSULDWH
remedy was to grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and issue an unconditional writ
setting aside the invalid judgment and sentence, barring retrial in state court, and directing
the State to immediately release Deerleader from its custody. 252
Despite the success of Deerleader in challenging his conviction, Native prisoners
should keep in mind that they may still be tried in federal court if their state court
convictions are overturned due to McGirt.253 Double jeopardy does not limit the federal
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRUH-prosecute the prisoner for a federal crime, such as a violation
of the Major Crimes Act or some other federal criminal statute.254
F. Summary
Post-conviction rights and remedies since McGirt have been overstated.255 As

244. Deerleader, 2021 WL 150014, at *3.
245. Id.
246. Id. at *4.
247. Id. at *5.
248. Id.
249. Deerleader, 2021 WL 150014, at *5.
250. Id.
251. Id. (quoting Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435, 443 (10th Cir. 2012)) (cleaned up).
252. Deerleader, 2021 WL 150014, at *5.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Kepler, 2021 WL 66654, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 7, 2021) (denying defendant¶s
motion to dismiss and noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution does not bar trial
in federal court after a defendant has already been convicted of a crime is state court).
254. See id.
255. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2479 (³Still, Oklahoma and the dissent fear, µ[t]housands¶ of Native Americans
like Mr. McGirt µwait in the wings¶ to challenge the jurisdictional basis of their state court convictions.´).
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Justice Neil Gorsuch put it in the McGirt RSLQLRQ³>'@HIHQGDQWVZKRGRWU\WRFKDOOHQJH
their state convictions may face significant procedural obstacles, thanks to well-known
VWDWHDQGIHGHUDOOLPLWDWLRQVRQSRVWFRQYLFWLRQUHYLHZLQFULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJV´256 These
limitations include, as discussed above, exhaustion, waiver, and the one-year statute of
limitations for challenging a conviction. The Deerleader case discussed above is the only
case I found in which a Native prisoner successfully challenged his conviction in federal
court.
On the bright side for defendants, however, this might not be a bad thing. As Justice
Sonia Sotomayor observed during McGirt¶VRUDODUJXPHQW³VRPHGHIHQGDQWVZKRZRXOG
be entitled to challenge their convictions would choose not to because the risk would be
WRRKLJKIRUWKHP´GXHWRVRPHKLJKHUSHQDOWLHVLQIHGHUDOFRXUWWKDQLQVWDWH FRXUW 257
Justice Gorsuch echoed this sentiment in the majority opinion.258 And many defendants
will have served much of their sentences already. Further, defendants must keep in mind
that they would be subject to prosecution again by the United States and the Mvskoke
Nation, or both, if their conviction is overturned. 259 Therefore, it might not make sense
for a defendant to challenge his or her conviction after McGirt.
VI. CONCLUSION
The practical effects of the McGirt decision as they relate to new rates of violence,
criminal jurisdiction, police powers, and post-conviction rights are still inconclusive.
Nobody can say for certain how this will affect the staggeringly high crime rates in Indian
country. It remains to be seen how law enforcement will cope with the changes inherent
in having three sovereigns with criminal jurisdiction in one major metroplex like Tulsa.
Likewise, it is impossible to know how many Native prisoners will challenge their
convictions and seek new trials.
It is clear, however, what should happen: The Mvskoke Nation should increase
cooperation; the federal government should provide more funding to Lighthorse officers
and other branches of the Mvskoke criminal justice system; and prisoners should challenge
their convictions if they are able to do so within one year of their conviction becoming
final.

256. Id.
257. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18 ln.23±19 ln.1, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2479 (No. 18-9526).
258. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2479 (³Still, Oklahoma and the dissent fear, µ[t]housands¶ of Native Americans like
Mr. McGirt µwait in the wings¶ to challenge the jurisdictional basis of their state court convictions. But this
number is admittedly speculative, because many defendants may choose to finish their state sentences rather than
risk reprosecution in federal court where sentences can be graver.´) (citation to the record omitted).
259. See United States v. Magnan, 863 F.3d 1284, 1291 (10th Cir. 2017).
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